Naval War College Review

Volume 46
Number 1 *Winter*

Article 28

1993

C 3 I: Issues of Command and Control,

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Brodie et al.); however, the author argues further that this tendency stifled thought and "Air Force official thinking became increasingly insipid." In fact, divergence from official theory became heresy and de facto censorship resulted, a point noted by Bob Woodward in *The Commanders*. Even the experience of utility of tactical interdiction and close air support demonstrated in the Korean War did not change the direction of thinking—strategic bombing was the one true faith. Thus, Vietnam found the "Air Force winging its way into Southeast Asia on a doctrine devised for bombing Nazi Germany."

Tilford undertakes an extended analysis of the various air campaigns and acknowledges the destructive interference of high-level targeting decisions. He states that the fundamental problem was political. The total devastation of North Vietnam was not a politically permissible choice for the administration, but the only sure way to end North Vietnam's support of the war in the south was to topple the Hanoi regime. In Tilford's words, the "great conundrum became how to defeat North Vietnam without defeating North Vietnam." Thus, analysis of mission execution and even the assessment of damage misses the point; "Perhaps, the bombing was not so much unsuccessful as it was irrelevant to the war in the South."

This work is a copiously documented and persuasive presentation of the case that the clash of political realities and strategic aims, not "one-hand-behind-the-back" restrictions and incremental increases in war effort, proved the deciding factors in accounting for the failure of the Air Force and air power to decide the Vietnam War. Nor could the other services alone or jointly have done any better. Given the resolve of the North Vietnamese, the nature of their war effort, and the unwillingness of the American people to support a much longer or dramatically more devastating war, it is hard to see what military action would have been appropriate or acceptable—the combination of political ends sought were simply not achievable by any military means.

As Tilford concludes, "In the end, dropping eight million tons of bombs was no substitute for a coherent strategy." *Setup* is an essential contribution to the study of our longest war.

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Coakley, Thomas P., ed. *C³I: Issues of Command and Control*. Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1991. 408pp. (No price given) (Available from Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Washington, D.C. 20402).

This compilation is an intriguing addition to the record of national security decision making during the 1980s. A combined effort of the National Defense University and Harvard's Program on Information Resources Policy has produced a well edited, annotated, and indexed

collection of excerpts from Harvard's annual seminars on C^3I issues.

Former and current senior government officials convened in Cam-bridge, Massachusetts, each year to offer unclassified presentations about the different aspects of national C^3I policy.

Thomas Coakley, professor of English at the Air Force Academy, has distilled the thirteen hundred pages of their seminar transcripts into a fascinating read—no mean feat given common perceptions of the topic. The various discussions have been divided into five broad areas and chronologically woven together to form a surprisingly coherent whole. Dispensing with conventional notes, he has inserted helpful "informational cut-ins" that not only tell the reader who was who but also serve as a good refresher to the not-so-distant events, such as Grenada, Beirut, and *Mayaguez*, that often come up in discussion. The Goldwater-Nichols Act may seem a bit dated, but most issues covered are still with us.

The years included are from 1980 to 1987, encompassing the last year of the Carter administration and most of the Reagan era. Given the seniority of both the military and civilian participants, these presentations offer an unusually frank discussion of the many crises of the 1980s and earlier. Although these lectures were recorded when the Soviet Union was the primary threat, the reader is struck by how many C^3I crises actually revolved around terrorism, and low-intensity and regional conflicts.

This work is a fascinating testimony of the senior level civilians and military officers who received and transmitted White House strategy and policy during a pivotal decade, and it depicts a variety of inside views of national security decision making from those very close to the top—an unvarnished "inside the Beltway" story. Accordingly, the operational military officer will not find much of immediate practical application here. However, anyone who is interested in how the National Command Authority actually operates, especially during a crisis, will find it useful reading.

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Broad, William J. *Teller's War.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992. 350pp. $25

To many on both sides of the political arena, Edward Teller personifies the role of scientists and science in making defense policy in the nuclear age. Present at the creation of that age, Teller rode its crest through to the collapse of the Soviet military.

Yet not a single weapon which he helped to create played a vital role or was ever used against its intended enemy. Some were serious failures—including two generations of H-bombs and the X-ray laser for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). How then does one explain his continued influence on American nuclear defense policy and strategy?

William Broad, a two-time Pulitzer Prize winner for scientific reporting for *The New York Times*, wisely